Strategic and Tactical Nuclear Weapons
Strategic Nuclear Weapons
A strategic nuclear weapon refers to a nuclear weapon that is designed to be used on targets often in settled territory far from the battlefield as part of a strategic plan, such as military bases, military command centers, arms industries, transportation, economic, and energy infrastructure, and heavily populated.
Tactical Nuclear Weapons
A tactical nuclear weapon or non-strategic nuclear weapons are nuclear weapons that are designed to be used on a battlefield in military situations mostly with friendly forces in proximity and perhaps even on contested friendly territory. Usually, these are short-range. Pakistan has tactical nuclear weapons of 60 km as well. In the case of the United States and Russia, tactical weapons could be in the range of thousand km as well. ( Examples Nasr, Ghaznavi)
Deterrence Vs Preemptive Strike
Preventive War
A preventive war is military, diplomatic, and strategic endeavor, aimed at an enemy whom one expects to grow so strong that delay would cause defeat. A preemptive strike is a military operation or series of operations to preempt an enemy's ability to attack you. Examples, United States attack on Iraq in 2003,
Deterrence
Deterrence is defined as "one sets up the tripwire and then leaves things up to the opponent without any time limit. Read more about it.
Structural Realism
The strategy also elevates preemption in importance. It is visible within the tool kit of U.S. foreign policy. The administration argues that the continued spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) technology to states with a history of aggression creates an unacceptable level of risk and presents “a compelling case for taking anticipatory actions to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack.”
End of Strategic Stability: Nuclear Weapons and the Challenges of Regional Rivalry
The nuclear doctrine of Pakistan that is credible minimum deterrence had cautioned India not to try any adventure on borders. But the story is coming to an end. Disrupting nuclear stability is opening a new chapter of nuclear armageddon in South Asia. India is thriving for nuclear triad and is trying tooth and nail to sabotage Pakistan's second-strike capability with its missile defense systems along with accomplishing nuclear triad. Pakistan, of course, would not be soothingly waiting for it to happen. Pakistan must be playing its cards. But new chapters of nuclear stability would be opened in the coming years if regional rivalry does not take a turn.
Pakistan Nuclear Posture ( Doctrine)
Pakistan has not declared a strategic nuclear policy but appears to maintain “minimum credible deterrence” against India's nuclear and superior (in numbers) conventional forces. Pakistan has adopted a position of “no first use” against non-nuclear-weapon states.
Indian Nuclear Posture
India has a declared nuclear no-first-use policy and is in the process of developing a nuclear doctrine based on "credible minimum deterrence." In August 1999, the Indian government released a draft of the doctrine which asserts that nuclear weapons are solely for deterrence and that India will pursue a policy of no-first-use.
But in recent escalations after the Pulwama attack, India has manifested to change its nuclear doctrine. India is re-thinking about its nuclear policies. Official statements and acts of politicians, armed personnel cadres, and other officials are clearly directing this fact.
Deterrence at Operation Level
For Pakistan, deterrence has penetrated from the strategic to the operational level. Tactical nuclear weapons are intended to be used tactically. Moreover, Pakistan's development of tactical nuclear weapons
also indicates that Pakistan intends to use them in case there is conventional
aggression from India. That is if India decides to operationalize its
“Coldstart Doctrine” or similar. For Pakistan, security is stability.
Reason for Strategic Instability in South Asian Rivals:
Desire for
Stability Manifest Differently in India and Pakistan
Tactical nuclear weapons and the “Coldstart” doctrine are intended to be used in ground operations for limited scale but intense war conditions. It compels Pakistan to include conventional
forces in strategic stability discussion. But for India, only nuclear weapons includes Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) discussions. It is the largest fissures that could not be narrowed in decades.
The desire for stability is manifested differently in Pakistani and Indian thinking.
Pakistan tries to talk about strategic nuclear confidence-building measures (CBMs) and conventional forces reduction simultaneously. That is linked with Pakistan’s perception of strategic stability.
For Pakistan, security falls in the stability basket. For India,
security is concern vis-Ã -vis Pakistan.
Former Foreign Secretary of Pakistan Shamshad Ahmad rightly stated:
For India, it is global status and for Pakistan, it is its security and survival.
For Pakistan, security is stability count Indian conventional forces in Confidence Building Measures Discussion for Strategic Stability. For India, security is important that is vis-Ã -vis Pakistan. And for Pakistan, security is important but it falls in the stability basket.
Trust Deficit
There is no mutual understanding between them for strategic
stability. India is power-oriented towards the status quo. Pakistan’s focus is on regional stability but it undermines
stability by its revisionist policies. Pakistan equates stability with security. And India links
security with stability. India does not want to include conventional forces in the discussion. It has its power ambitions.
Balance vs Parity
India is looking for balance rather than parity. Pakistan
and China collectively have 450 weapons and Pakistan alone has more than India.
But India is not concerned about this. Trinity of nuclear doctrine concerns
India more. Enhancing second-strike capability by the triad is an objective India is working for. Investing in command and control systems, reconnaissance,
antisatellite, surveillance, intelligence, and Ballistic Missile defense system, s-400 is on the high priority agenda.
Repercussions of Strategic Instability
Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNW) Lowers
the Threshold
High accuracy, shoot and scoot NASR Missile with 60 km range
and capability to take away appropriate nuclear weapons is a good way for Pakistan to keep
minimum credible deterrence, analysts in Pakistan think. Pakistan keeps its nuclear weapons more launch-ready. It
increases the threat to the region. As it can be first used by Pakistan with
minimum warning time to India. It gives security to Pakistan and reduces the Indian threat of any conventional mishap under the cold-start doctrine. But in the bigger picture, India and Pakistan have been lowering the security threshold for the region. It will put the region under greater threat.
Wayforward
Risk
Reduction and Crisis Management
Risk reduction must start at the lower level. Risk reduction and crisis management cells must be set up at command and control as well as other levels. There must be a mechanism to avert the nuclear threat between two nuclearly armed arch-rivals. Both sides need to take measures to control the battle at a lower level. Nuclear risk reduction centers must be established. The ultimate method for risk reduction is the successful implementation of conflict resolution mechanisms for Pakistan and India.
To avert nuclear armageddon, conflict resolution should be accomplished earliest. South Asia is among the sites that have the highest tendency to go nuclear.
