Deterrence Vs Preemptive Strikes: Strategic Instability Between India and Pakistan

Strategic and Tactical Nuclear Weapons  

Strategic Nuclear Weapons

A strategic nuclear weapon refers to a nuclear weapon that is designed to be used on targets often in settled territory far from the battlefield as part of a strategic plan, such as military bases, military command centers, arms industries, transportation, economic, and energy infrastructure, and heavily populated.

Tactical Nuclear Weapons  

A tactical nuclear weapon or non-strategic nuclear weapons are nuclear weapons that are designed to be used on a battlefield in military situations mostly with friendly forces in proximity and perhaps even on contested friendly territory. Usually, these are short-range. Pakistan has tactical nuclear weapons of 60 km as well. In the case of the United States and Russia, tactical weapons could be in the range of thousand km as well. ( Examples Nasr, Ghaznavi)

Deterrence Vs Preemptive Strike 

 Preventive War

A preventive war is military, diplomatic, and strategic endeavor, aimed at an enemy whom one expects to grow so strong that delay would cause defeat. A preemptive strike is a military operation or series of operations to preempt an enemy's ability to attack you. Examples, United States attack on Iraq in 2003, 

Deterrence

Deterrence is defined as "one sets up the tripwire and then leaves things up to the opponent without any time limit. Read more about it.  

Structural Realism

The strategy also elevates preemption in importance. It is visible within the tool kit of U.S. foreign policy. The administration argues that the continued spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) technology to states with a history of aggression creates an unacceptable level of risk and presents “a compelling case for taking anticipatory actions to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack.”

End of Strategic Stability: Nuclear Weapons and the Challenges of Regional Rivalry

The nuclear doctrine of Pakistan that is credible minimum deterrence had cautioned India not to try any adventure on borders. But the story is coming to an end. Disrupting nuclear stability is opening a new chapter of nuclear armageddon in South Asia. India is thriving for nuclear triad and is trying tooth and nail to sabotage Pakistan's second-strike capability with its missile defense systems along with accomplishing nuclear triad. Pakistan, of course, would not be soothingly waiting for it to happen. Pakistan must be playing its cards. But new chapters of nuclear stability would be opened in the coming years if regional rivalry does not take a turn. 

 Pakistan Nuclear Posture ( Doctrine)

Pakistan has not declared a strategic nuclear policy but appears to maintain “minimum credible deterrence” against India's nuclear and superior (in numbers) conventional forces. Pakistan has adopted a position of “no first use” against non-nuclear-weapon states.

Indian Nuclear Posture

India has a declared nuclear no-first-use policy and is in the process of developing a nuclear doctrine based on "credible minimum deterrence." In August 1999, the Indian government released a draft of the doctrine which asserts that nuclear weapons are solely for deterrence and that India will pursue a policy of no-first-use. 

But in recent escalations after the Pulwama attack, India has manifested to change its nuclear doctrine. India is re-thinking about its nuclear policies. Official statements and acts of politicians, armed personnel cadres, and other officials are clearly directing this fact. 

Deterrence at Operation Level

For Pakistan, deterrence has penetrated from the strategic to the operational level. Tactical nuclear weapons are intended to be used tactically. Moreover, Pakistan's development of tactical nuclear weapons also indicates that Pakistan intends to use them in case there is conventional aggression from India. That is if India decides to operationalize its “Coldstart Doctrine” or similar. For Pakistan, security is stability.

Reason for Strategic Instability in South Asian Rivals: 

Desire for Stability Manifest Differently in India and Pakistan

Tactical nuclear weapons and the “Coldstart” doctrine are intended to be used in ground operations for limited scale but intense war conditions. It compels Pakistan to include conventional forces in strategic stability discussion. But for India, only nuclear weapons includes Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) discussions. It is the largest fissures that could not be narrowed in decades. 

The desire for stability is manifested differently in Pakistani and Indian thinking.

Pakistan tries to talk about strategic nuclear confidence-building measures (CBMs)  and conventional forces reduction simultaneously. That is linked with Pakistan’s perception of strategic stability.

For Pakistan, security falls in the stability basket. For India, security is concern vis-à-vis Pakistan.

Former Foreign Secretary of Pakistan Shamshad Ahmad rightly stated:

For India, it is global status and for Pakistan, it is its security and survival.

For Pakistan, security is stability count Indian conventional forces in Confidence Building Measures Discussion for Strategic Stability. For India, security is important that is vis-à-vis Pakistan. And for Pakistan, security is important but it falls in the stability basket.

 Trust Deficit

There is no mutual understanding between them for strategic stability. India is power-oriented towards the status quo. Pakistan’s focus is on regional stability but it undermines stability by its revisionist policies. Pakistan equates stability with security. And India links security with stability. India does not want to include conventional forces in the discussion. It has its power ambitions.

 Balance vs Parity

India is looking for balance rather than parity. Pakistan and China collectively have 450 weapons and Pakistan alone has more than India. But India is not concerned about this. Trinity of nuclear doctrine concerns India more. Enhancing second-strike capability by the triad is an objective India is working for. Investing in command and control systems, reconnaissance, antisatellite, surveillance, intelligence, and Ballistic Missile defense system, s-400 is on the high priority agenda. 

Repercussions of Strategic Instability 

Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNW) Lowers the Threshold

High accuracy, shoot and scoot NASR Missile with 60 km range and capability to take away appropriate nuclear weapons is a good way for Pakistan to keep minimum credible deterrence, analysts in Pakistan think. Pakistan keeps its nuclear weapons more launch-ready. It increases the threat to the region. As it can be first used by Pakistan with minimum warning time to India. It gives security to Pakistan and reduces the Indian threat of any conventional mishap under the cold-start doctrine. But in the bigger picture, India and Pakistan have been lowering the security threshold for the region. It will put the region under greater threat. 

 Wayforward  

Risk Reduction and Crisis Management

Risk reduction must start at the lower level. Risk reduction and crisis management cells must be set up at command and control as well as other levels. There must be a mechanism to avert the nuclear threat between two nuclearly armed arch-rivals. Both sides need to take measures to control the battle at a lower level. Nuclear risk reduction centers must be established. The ultimate method for risk reduction is the successful implementation of conflict resolution mechanisms for Pakistan and India. 

To avert nuclear armageddon, conflict resolution should be accomplished earliest. South Asia is among the sites that have the highest tendency to go nuclear.  

Deterrence, Compellence, and Coercion

Understanding Coercion, Deterrence, and Compellence

Coercion is threatening to harm an enemy or pledging to benefit the enemy if the enemy complies with the demands of an assailant. Deterrence is a tripwire to avoid war and compellence is threatening to start one if victims do not subdue. 

 Outline: 

1. Coercion 
2. Deterrence and Compellence 
3. Analysis 

Coercion: 

Coercion is to do our bidding without destroying the enemy. Coercion is the threat of the use of force to overcome an enemy. The ultimate motive is to achieve goals under conflict without going to war. Force can simply use to hurt, if we uncover the point where it would hurt most, a threat to do so can motivate our opponent to avoid it. We shall call this coercive use of force. The use of coercion is to Open up room for bargaining.

Nuclear weapons states use the threat of use of nuclear weapons to quash an enemy. 

Strategic coercion:

Strategic coercion is what analysts call when larger armies are involved in conflicting parties. 

Examples from History: 

Mongols used brute force to terrorize the opponents. Usually massacred the whole city to show what they do to those who do not surrender. Sometimes, they left the city without damage as people surrender.

Coercion vs. Undue Influence

Roman people did the same. They slaughtered the whole city population along with animals. 

Two Methods of Coercion: 

1. A threat is a pledge to impose costs if the opponent acts contrary to one’s wishes. 
2. A promise is a pledge to provide benefits to the opponent if he acts by one’s wishes.                                                                                                                                                 Both threats and promises are intended to influence the expectations of the opponent and cause him to change his behavior. Both threats and promises are costly to the one making them although threats are costly if the player fails to influence the opponent, and promises are costly if the player succeeds

Coercion and Compellence

Brute Force:

Coercion mostly do the trick, however, often it is necessary to use brute force to make the threat of further violence more credible. The threat is necessary and had to perform if the enemy does not comply.

High school bully uses brute force to take away lunch money. Force is used indeed. 

Salami Tactics is taking small steps that do not deter response from the enemy. 

Deterrence and Compellence: 

 Schelling defined compellence as “a threat intended to make an adversary do something,”

While deterrence is defined as "one sets up the tripwire and then leaves things up to the opponent without any time limit".

Deterrence 1        Conservative and passive 2        Protects status quo 3        Persuade the enemy not to initiate its action 4        We make the demand, explain the consequences, and wait for action 5        If opponent crosses the line, we take punitive action 6        It is difficult to judge whether it was a success or not. 7        Best achieved by threat (sanctions, embargoes) 8        Can be passive and static. Sets up the tripwire and then leave it up to the enemy to cross it.  9        Punishment if the status quo disturbed

Compellence            Compellence is active          Seeks to change the status quo                                Persuade the enemy to change its behavior           We make a demand of action and then initiate our own, continue doing so until opponent ceases          To persuade the opponent to change its behavior or government,            Success is easy to see in form of change of government, or halt of ongoing behavior.            Best achieved by promise (to invest in the country, economic aid, military aid, USAID, infrastructure development)            Compellence must have a deadline.            Progressively worse if not compliant, reward if comply          Like offensive strategy, it takes the initiative and engages the opponent until the later relents.

 

 

Deterrence and Deniability

 Analysis: 

The difference is in timing, initiative, and monitoring. A deterrent can be passive and static. One sets up the tripwire and then leaves things up to the opponent without any time limit. As we shall see, stationing American troops in Europe provided a trip-wire (or plate glass) that performed these functions. If the Soviets ever decided to attack, they have to do it in a strength that would be sufficient to overcome these forces.

Example: 

Throughout the Cold War, the U.S. constantly worried about the possibility of the USSR attacking Western Europe. The problem was that in conventional armaments, the Red Army was much, much stronger than what NATO could muster against it. A general war over Western Europe almost invariably meant that the U.S. would have to resort to nuclear weapons. The Americans could say “If you ever attack Western Europe, we shall fight back with all we’ve got, including nukes.” Then they could sit back, wait, and watch. Only if the Soviets ever invaded would the Americans have to do anything.

 

 Salami-Slice Tactics and Deterrent: 

The deterrent can be eroded by salami tactics, a strategy that takes steps that are small enough not to activate the threatened action, yet that brings the player closer to his goal.

Choose with Objective: 

Generally, if deterrence is the goal, you would do best by choosing a status quo such that if your opponent acts contrary to your wishes, what you do is punishment. This usually involves making the status quo sufficiently pleasant and threatening to make it much worse if he disrupts it. You can also promise to make it progressively better as long as he persists in compliance. If compellence is the goal, you would do best by choosing a status quo such that what you do if the opponent complies with your demand becomes a reward. This usually requires that you make the status quo sufficiently unpleasant and promise to improve it if he complies. You can also threaten to make the status quo progressively worse if he persists in non-compliance.